Oft en a distinction is made between interpersonal and institutional trust, as the former is defi ned in terms of encapsulated interests, that is the idea that somebody will take your interests into account. Scholars have argued that this cannot be applied to institutions and that generalized institutional trust is therefore not a meaningful concept. Th is article disputes this reasoning by distinguishing this kind of trust in the governance of capital cities from such trust in non-capital cities. It argues that it can be doubted especially for the local administration in capital cities that they predominantly have the interests of their residents in mind when making decisions. Th e resulting hypothesis that residents of capital cities have less trust in their local administration than residents of non-capital cities is tested and confi rmed through a secondary analysis of Urban Audit data. Th e analysis shows a signifi cant eff ect in the predicted direction, which remains strong when controlling for the satisfaction with public issues, the respective region, and poverty of the respondent. Th e conclusion is that citizens in municipalities do know whether or not local institutions have their interests in mind when making decisions, which makes institutional trust equally meaningful a concept as interpersonal trust.
Introduction
Living in a big city has benefi ts as ample facilities can be expected to be available. It has, of course, also its downsides, as there might be nuisances, such as a lot of noise, a bad quality of air, expensive housing, traffi c congestion, safety issues et cetera. So, on the one hand, living in such a city involves high expectations about having a pleasant life, while on the other hand there are low expectations, about all the nuisances involved in living in such a city (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009; Rossman 2016; van der Wusten 2000; Rowat 1973; Gottmann and Harper 1990; Mäeltsemees 2010 ).
In capital cities, the nuisances as well as available facilities are oft en even more extreme than in other big cities. Th e reasons, to be elaborated upon in this article, refer to the symbolic function of the capital for the country as a whole, its proximity to national government and the relative multitude of functions it therefore has to take care of. Th is could imply that capital cities act less on the behalf of their own residents and more on behalf of the country as a whole and its national government. If that is the case, its residents might have less trust in their local administration, as such trust is based on perceived encapsulated interests, that is the idea that the local administration will take its residents' interests into account and is capable of meeting the high and low expectations of its residents. For all of the mentioned issues, local government has a responsibility of taking care thereof, and if local government does indeed take adequate care of them, residents might be inclined to trust that local government. Th e reasoning is that when your expectations are met, this implies that you judge the one responsible, that is the local administration, to have acted on your behalf and to be capable of doing so, which are the two main ingredients of trust.
Notwithstanding the inherent logic of such reasoning, it is a disputed kind of reasoning, as scholars have repeatedly argued that it is not meaningful to talk about such institutional trust. Th e late Russell Hardin (2000 Hardin ( , 2002 Hardin ( , 2013 has been the strongest proponent of that argument. His claim was that trust has to be seen in terms of encapsulated interests, that is, it being in the interest of the trusted one to act on the trustee's behalf. As it is generally not known for government and its offi cials whether they "act on my behalf ", such institutional trust cannot be a meaningful concept (Hardin 2002, 156) . At most one could talk about confi dence in, or the trustworthiness of, government, which are rather diff erent concepts.
Th is article aims to combine Hardin's reasoning about the nature of trust with an analysis showing that generalized trust is still a meaningful concept. We agree with Hardin that trust is about encapsulated interests and also about capabilities, as it is a three-way relation of A trusting B to do X. Regarding institutional trust, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between the local administration of diff erent cities, based on the doubts their residents can have that these local administrations are inclined to act on their behalf. Th ese reasonable doubts are refl ected in the actual level of the local residents' trust in the respective local administrations. Secondly, we will argue that citizens are aware of, i.e. "have knowledge of ", the extent to which their expectations of living in their city are fulfi lled, and that they infer from this knowledge whether the local administration is capable to accomplish what is desired. Th is is also refl ected in their trust in the local administration.
Th is article, therefore, asks whether the outcomes of an analysis on the trust in the local administration of big cities, distinguishing between capitals and noncapitals, point to the meaningfulness of the use of institutional trust. as comparable to interpersonal trust. In order to answer that question, the following sub-questions are consecutively addressed:
1. What does the distinction between interpersonal an institutional trust entail ? 2. What is so special about capital cities compared to non-capital cities that one might expect the trust in its administration to be lower ?
3. Is the trust in the local administration of capital cities indeed lower than in noncapital cities ?
4. Does this relation hold when controlled for the satisfaction with the meeting of high and low expectations ?
5. What does this imply for the meaningfulness of institutional trust ?
We structure this article as follows. First, we give a short theoretical exposé on the discussion about the meaning of trust and the comparability of interpersonal and institutional trust. Th e article continues with an elaboration on the high and low expectations of living in European cities and capital cities in particular. Th is part of the article is based on existing literature, regarding the merits of living in (capital) cities. Th e methods section presents the data used -the Urban Audit -and the survey questions involved and refl ects on their validity and reliability to answer the research question. All this is the prelude for the presentation of the outcomes of testing the hypothesis that trust in the local administration is a function of its capabilities and encapsulated interests.
Th is kind of research is not only relevant because of its theoretical implications regarding institutional trust, but also because there is a growing concern about the distrust in government as "citizens' trust in government is currently at a record low" (OECD 2017, 34) . Th e World Bank in its 2017 yearly report notices that "Trust is a central aspect of strengthening governance and delivering on development. As such trust is said to be related to positive outcomes in terms of economic growth, as well as government performance" (World Bank 2017, 55) , and if such institutional trust is indeed a meaningful concept, the task is to fi nd out what enhances and what decreases such institutional trust.
Theory

Interpersonal and institutional trust
In the scholarly literature, a distinction is made between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. Th e former is oft en defi ned as a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another. It is in the words of Seligman (2000, 43) "some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other, given the opaqueness of other's intentions and calculations" or, as Russel Hardin defi ned it, the expectation of "encapsulated interest", that is, the knowledge that it is in the interest of the trusted to act on my behalf (Hardin in Warren 1999, 24) .
Such interpersonal trust is assumed to be based on three factors. First of all, on the reliance that -regarding a person's intentions and capabilities -the extent to which future expectations are met is not diff erent from past experiences. Trust in this sense is about building a reputation, involving the promise of fulfi lling obligations. Secondly, interpersonal trust can be based on common characteristics of the trustee and the trusted, as given in familiarity, background, gender, age, and ethnicity. You trust somebody, because he or she is like yourself, because you share strong basic evaluations and a set of moral values (Seligman 2000, 69) . As you are most likely inclined to trust yourself, you are also inclined to trust somebody else if that person is like you. In that case, it will be more likely that it is in the interest of that other to act in your interest. Th irdly, trust can be based on institutional arrangements, such as the existence of guarantees, rules and regulations, that ensure that others will do what they promise to do. It is not necessary that you trust the person as such to have an interest to act in your interest, but you accept the vulnerability of trusting him or her anyway, because you are assured that the person will have the right intentions and behavior, as he or she will otherwise be sanctioned (Costa 2000, 11) .
As argued in the introduction it has been disputed whether the same kind of trust can be shown to institutions (cf. Luhmann 2017; Hardin 2000) . We don't know the intentions of institutions; if they are working in favor of government or citizens. Hence, all that is needed to warrant relations of trust with government is absent, and we cannot reasonably judge through experience whether it is in the interest of government to encapsulate our interests (cf. Warren 1999, 5) .
Th is reasoning assumes that citizens hardly have any knowledge about the workings of the institution at stake. However, one can expect at least some knowledge on the citizen's part about the workings of government. Aft er all, in many countries, schools are encouraged, and sometimes even obligated, to teach subjects under such varying names as public aff airs, citizenship, humanities, social sciences, politics and economy. Th ere are newspapers, television and radio programs, nowadays supplemented with social media, that continuously inform us about the inter-nal and external workings of government. Citizens experience the quality of public life in their cities or rural areas and are able to judge the quality of the surroundings. Furthermore, public offi cials continuously inform citizens why certain policies are needed, they account for their actions and provide arguments for their decisions in parliaments, local councils and through other channels. Talking about trust in public institutions, we may not be talking about interests that encapsulate one's personal interests -in that regard the distance between the resident and its government might be too large, but we could talk about the extent to which it is in the interest of government to encapsulate the public interest. Do the interests of the local administration encapsulate the interests of the city ? Can we be assured that local administrations make decisions that are in the interest of the municipality, and is it in the interest of local administrations to do so ? Institutional trust is about the confi dence that the local administration's prime concern is the well-being of the local residents and that it is capable of taking care thereof. Such trust is partly based on knowledge of the basic idea or "good" of the institution (cf. Off e in Warren 1999), partly based on what becomes public knowledge through all kinds of media channels, and partly based on the satisfaction with the outcomes of their actions. In this sense, institutional trust in public organizations is comparable with interpersonal trust.
Such institutional trust is important as it results in compliance and support for the trusted institution, the ease with which diffi cult decisions are accepted, and the willingness of citizens to coproduce policies together with that government. Research points to outcomes that people believing government to be competent are more likely to provide the critical resources to government and less inclined to evade taxes; generalized high-level trust is expected to encourage sociability, participation with others and to enrich social networks, because it makes people cooperate instead of fi ghting, makes them active, and encourages them to behave morally (Off e 1999, 122) . Yamamura showed for Japan that institutionalized trust makes people more likely to express preferences for income redistribution and to perceive their tax burden as low (Yamamura 2012) . On the other hand, lacking trust as a sign of no confi dence in the institutional arrangement of a system does in the end make the system collapse (Luhmann 2017) , and if it does not collapse, it does at least need costlier ways of cooperation, namely through formal rules and regulations, resulting in high transaction costs. Th erefore, distrust in society imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not have to pay (Fukuyama 1995, 27 -28) .
The functions of capital cities and the implications for trust in their local administration
This subsection argues that it is possible to distinguish (local) public administrations according to the degree to which they can be expected to act predominantly in the interest of their (local) residents, and to the degree to which they are able to meet their (local) residents' high and low expectations, for which they are at least partly held responsible. This distinction made is between capital and non-capital cities.
What makes a capital city special in terms of trusting its local administration is that, according to Mäeltsemees, "Each capital city has a certain symbolic meaning to its state; the whole state is assessed based on its capital city … the capital city generally diff ers from the rest of the local governments of the state" (2010, 25) . Th is symbolic function of capital cities is, fi rst of all, seen in their history, oft en with still existing remnants of the country's ancient glorious times. Such remnants can refer to palaces; a cathedral or temple as a symbol of the location of the dominant religion in the country, with the (previous) head of the dominant denomination located there; and the place itself even seen as being the bridge between heaven and earth. Another historical vestige might be a large square or plaza, oft en named aft er the nation or a famous historical national hero, being symbolic and still in use for national manifestations. It is also seen in the location of cultural institutions such as (national) universities, national theatres, and national museums embodying the supra-local even national cultural heritage. Th irdly, capital cities are typically the location for political institutes. Th e government as the executive power oft en resides in the capital city, as do national assemblies, parliaments, senates and other legislative powers. Both executive and legislative powers share the fact that they symbolize the concentration of political power in that specifi c locality.
Th e capital city is, therefore, the symbol of national unity, of political power, and of the level of development of a country. As Gottman and Harper (1990) indicated:
Th e capital is by defi nition a seat of power and a place of decision-making processes that aff ect the lives and the future of the nation ruled, and that may infl uence trends and events beyond its borders. Capitals diff er from other cities, as the capital function secures strong and lasting centrality; it calls for a special hosting environment to provide what is required for the safe and effi cient performance of the functions of government and decision-making characteristics of the place (63).
Th e few scholars who analyzed life in capital cities all emphasized the additional functions and challenges of such localities, because of their triple role in maintaining livability for residents, being the principal locus of national economic success, and acting as the window of the country to the outside world to attract foreign investments. Th ese multiple priorities result in a spread of concrete policy areas to address. Logan (2005) argued, "Such cities perform functions at three levels … a capital city is a city for all of the nation's citizens and performs functions for the whole nation. Th ese functions are at both the national level … and international level" (560). Th e consequences are also clear, as Douglas (2005) Th e multiplicity of goals results in specifi c issues for capital cities. Oft en mentioned are the population growth, the resulting excessive housing prices, traffi c congestion, air-pollution, the continuous noise, and the resulting need to maintain and increase divertissements. House prices are generally highest -for most EU Member States -in their capital city. Th is is particularly true in the Czech Republic, where the average price of a house in Praha is almost fi ve times as high as the national average. It is also true elsewhere, with house prices in London, Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm far exceeding those in the rest of the respective countries. In other countries, it is typical to fi nd house prices in capital cities around twice as high as national averages (Statistics on European Cities 2017).
Capital cities have the potential to play a crucial role in urban developments; they are oft en hubs for competitiveness and employment and may be seen as drivers of innovation and growth, as well as centers for education, science, social, cultural and ethnic diversity. Th is is supported by their having an advantage in profi ting from new developments, such as primary nodes in networks of (high speed) railways, Internet, and international airports. Scholars have also argued that this increases the attractiveness of capital cities (European Cities Monitor 2002, 159) . Th ey continue by arguing that the performance of capital cities is supported by the quality of the workforce, access to markets and external transport links, and they conclude by stating; " [O] ut of the 30 top performers, 20 are capital cities" (European Cities Monitor 2002, 159).
Th e above implies that positive (high) expectations about cultural facilities, infrastructure, public spaces, employment opportunities et cetera might be more extreme in capital cities than in non-capital cities, and that negative (low) expectations about nuisances involved in living in a city might also be more extreme in a capital city than in a non-capital city.
Th e implications of having the national government and political power within one's borders could also be huge for the trust in the local administration of capital cities. As van der Wusten (2000) explained:
Nowadays capital cities have a considerable segment of civil servants in their resident population … All these functions in their turn attract other service providers that then become relevant for diff erent purposes (museum quarters as part of the general tourist attraction, the hosting environment as an asset in the interna-tional conference business, the presence of political authority to attract functions from a diff erent system of governance) (130).
Hence, the composition of a capital city will diff er from the population elsewhere in the country and on a micro administrative level the relations among public offi cials working at diff erent levels might be closer. Th is might impact the turnover of individual public offi cials between the national and local levels. As remuneration at the national level is mostly higher than at the local level, the probability might increase that the brightest local politicians and civil servants are transferred to the higher level, leaving the municipality with mediocre civil servants. In terms of trusting the local administration all this could have a negative eff ect, as it is not self-evident that the local administrators have the interest of the residents of the capital city in mind, or their own interests in becoming an administrator at the national level.
Th e proximity to national governments could also result in confl icts. As Rowat indicated in 1973 regarding capital cities in federal systems, "Th e federal government wants to control and develop the national capital in the interest of the nation as a whole, while the people of the capital naturally wish to govern themselves to the greatest extent possible" (Rowat 1973, xi) .
Th e proximity to national government might also infl uence the opinions of local offi cials regarding core issues, such as centralization, decentralization, and intergovernmental relations in general. Where decentralization is said to be beneficial for citizens, centralization is advantageous for capital cities, thus distinguishing them from other municipalities. As the OECD (2005) noted, decentralization oft en comes at the cost of the capital city, as infrastructure tends to become more decentralized in terms of hubs for airports and high-speed trains.
Furthermore, one can ask who is governing the capital city. Are the locally elected or appointed politicians in charge, or is it national government that makes the decisions, and what does that imply for policy-making, public participation, and the residents ? As van der Wusten (2000) Th is could make the residents doubtful about the prime interests of the local administration in their city and whether it is predominantly the national or local interest that is encapsulated in the local administration's interests.
Th e proximity of national government to the capital city is thus expected to diminish the generalized institutional trust of the residents of such cities in their local administration. Th ose residents are right in questioning the extent to which it is the local administration that runs the city, or whether it is national government. Th ey also cannot be convinced of the capability of their local administration because of the turnover rate between local and national administration in capital cities.
Th erefore, the residents of the capital city might worry about the interests that dominate the decisions made by their local administration. Th ey cannot be sure that their own interests as citizens are encapsulated in those decisions.
Th is argument can be furthered as the economic development of the country as a whole is oft en heavily dependent on the development of its capital city. It was calculated for Greece that its GDP would be 19.9 % lower without Athens; the GDP in France would fall 15 % without Paris; the Czech GDP would diminish 4.2 % without Prague; and Poland would lose 9.6 % of its GDP without Warsaw. Th e only country in Europe which does not have an excessive GDP contribution from its capital city is Germany (IDW 2014).
Because of all this, the hypothesis is that residents of capital cities will have less trust in their local administration than the residents of non-capital cities, as there can be reasonable doubts whether the interests of the residents are encapsulated in the decisions made by local administrations in capital cities. Th is hypothesis is tested in the subsequent part of this paper.
Methods
We test this hypothesis fi rst by comparing the opinions of citizens in pairs of cities within a country and do that for all pairs of cities for which information is available. Th e data used are derived from the Urban Audit. Th e Urban Audit conducted "a survey in June 2015 to measure the local perceptions of quality of life in 79 cities in the 28 Member States of the European Union and cities in Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey" (European Commission 2010), Earlier surveys were conducted in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2012 . For the survey in 2015, 41,000 people were interviewed. It includes a range of questions to citizens to express their views on various aspects of urban life. Th e survey exclusively focuses on quality of life, showing how satisfi ed people are with various aspects of urban life, such as employment opportunities, presence of foreigners, public transports and pollution in their cities. It is designed to allow cities to compare themselves on 30 criteria addressing social, economic, cultural and environmental issues. In each of the 79 cities approximately 500 citizens were interviewed. Th e Urban Audit does not incorporate multiple cities in all countries. Th is is, however, the case in the following 19 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. In each of these countries we created pairs of cities of which one is the capital and one is a non-capital city. Th is results in the 19 pairs of cities are given in the table in the next section.
Opinions on trust between these pairs of cities are compared, and the consistency in the diff erences over all 19 pairs determines whether the diff erences are statistically signifi cant. Th e signifi cance is determined with a paired sample t-test. If the diff erences are consistently in the same direction and are large enough, the Tvalue will achieve a high value. Considering that n-1 is 18 degrees of freedom, this results in either a p-value larger than 0.05, implying the diff erence is not signifi cant, or a p-value smaller than 0.05, implying the diff erences are signifi cant. Th e main diff erence is that one city in each pair is a capital city and the other not, and therefore diff erences found are due to that factor. Th e indicators for residents' trust in the local administration are measured through their opinions to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements: "Generally speaking, the administration in this city can be trusted. "
Aft er this analysis, we present the outcomes of a logit model for dichotomous data aimed at explaining the trust in the local administration in all cities and including control factors, such as the satisfaction with positive and negative expectations, as well as two control variables indicative for the prosperity of the respondents, namely whether they have problems paying their bills, and the region in which the country is located (CEE country or Western European country).
Based on the survey of 2012, we constructed two scales, each consisting of six items. Th e fi rst scale on the satisfaction with high-expectation issues was constructed around six items with a reliability of 0.60. It is based on the following question:
Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfi ed, rather satisfi ed, rather unsatisfi ed or not at all satisfi ed with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]?
•
Cultural facilities such as concert halls, theatres, museums and libraries • Sports facilities such as sport fi elds and indoor sport halls • Health care services, doctors and hospitals • Public transport, for example the bus, tram or metro • Schools and other educational facilities • Public spaces such as markets, squares, pedestrian areas
Th e second scale is on the satisfaction with low-expectation issues and was constructed around the following six items with a reliability of 0.66. It is based on the following question:
Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfi ed, rather satisfi ed, rather unsatisfi ed or not at all satisfi ed with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]?
• Th e state of the streets and buildings in your neighborhood
• Th e quality of the air • Cleanliness
• Th e noise level • I feel safe in [CITY NAME] • I feel safe in my neighborhood
Th is modeling aims at fi nding direct and interaction eff ects on trust. Th e analysis asks whether living in a capital city intensifi es or mitigates the eff ects of these factors and whether by including those factors still a signifi cant direct eff ect of living in the capital city on trust in the local administration remains.
Outcomes of the analysis
Trust in local administration
Th is section presents the outcomes of the research. Table 1 presents the outcomes on the opinions about the trust in the local administration comparing residents of capital cities with the next major city in the same country. Table 1 shows that the trust in the administration varies among capital cities and among the opinions of residents living in capital and non-capital cities. In some capital cities, such as Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, Bucharest, Bratislava, and Sofi a, all Southern European and CEE country capitals, trust in the administration is minimal. Opposite thereto, a vast majority of the residents of Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Helsinki, London, and Wien (all Northwest European capital cities) do trust the administration in their city. So, in this regard, there is a North-West South-East divide. However, the diff erences within countries are signifi cant. Th is is especially seen in Bulgaria, Spain, Rumania, and Slovakia with more than 17 points diff erences. Over all 19 pairs, the pairwise comparison between capital and non-capital cities in the same country results in a statistically signifi cant diff erence in trust levels to the detriment of the local administration in capital cities (T=-3.45 df=18 p=0.003).
Hence, the generalized institutional trust in the local administration in capital cities is signifi cantly less than the trust in the local administration in their partner city in the same country. On average, there is almost an eight-point diff erence. Th e main exceptions are Stockholm and Paris, which according to their residents have an even more trustworthy administration, than the ones in Malmö and Marseille, respectively. Does such trust also depend on the satisfaction with high and low expectation issues ? Table 2a and 2b show that this is indeed the case. Table 2a and 2b show that the two scales on satisfaction with high-and lowexpectation issues both have an equally strong impact on the trust in the local administration. In general, 63.2 % of the residents of big cities show trust in their local administration, but this rapidly declines when being dissatisfi ed with more highexpectation issues. Being dissatisfi ed with all high-expectation issues results in only a 21.3 % probability that the respondent will trust the local administration, while being satisfi ed with all six high-expectation issues results in an 81.9 % probability that the respondent will trust the local administration. Th e relation is strongly linear, as each point decrease in satisfaction with such issues results in approximately a 10 % lower probability one will trust the local administration.
Table 2a
Relation between satisfaction with low-expectation issues and trust Table 2b Relation between satisfaction with high-expectation issues and trust Exactly the same results are visible for the impact of satisfaction with lowexpectation issues. For both scales, the relation with trust is equally strong (γ=0.45 and 0.46 respectively, both highly signifi cant with a p< 0.000).
Both analyses already provide a preliminary answer to the question whether the concept of generalized institutional trust can be applied in a meaningful way to the trust in (local) governments. Th e satisfaction with positive and negative expectation issues as well as the varying doubts about the encapsulated interests of the local administration in capital and non-capital cities, have the expected and statistically signifi cant eff ect on the (dis)trust in the local administrations of those cities.
Trust in the local administration explained using a binary logit model
Th e question is whether these eff ects stay strong and signifi cant if controlled for region, being a capital city, and wealth of the respondent. Table 3 gives the outcomes of a binary logistic regression with trust in the local administration as the dependent variable and the satisfaction with low-and high-expectation issues, living in a capital or non-capital city, the region, and wealth of the respondent as independent variables. In the fi rst column, the eff ects are shown and in the last column the odds ratios are presented. All eff ects remain strong and signifi cant. a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. Table 3 shows that all the direct eff ects of living in a capital or non-capital city have the expected eff ects on trust in local administration. Th e odds ratio that one trusts the local administration when one lives in a capital city instead of a noncapital city is 0.81. Th e odds ratio that one trusts the local administration when one is poor instead of having no problems paying the bills is 0.82; the odds of trusting the local administration for persons living in a CEE country instead of a Western country is 0.72. All this implies that the probability of trusting the local administration is lower, when people are poor, live in a capital, and in a CEE-country. When people are satisfi ed with issues on which they have high expectations, the odds that they trust the local administration are 2.5 times as high as for people who are dissatisfi ed with such issues. Each additional issue one is satisfi ed with results in an increase of approximately 35 -39 % in the odds that one trusts the local administration compared to the situation in which one is dissatisfi ed with this issue. Regarding low-expectations issues, if they are still satisfi ed with them, the odds that they trust the local administration are also 2.5 times as high compared to residents who are dissatisfi ed with such issues. Th is implies that in general, trust in the local administration more than doubles when people are satisfi ed with either kind of social issues.
Interaction effects
A closer analysis shows that there are not only direct eff ects of these factors on trust, but also multiple interaction eff ects. Loglinear modeling shows that there are in total nine statistically signifi cant interaction eff ects.
We are especially interested in the interaction eff ects involving trust and either high or low expectations. For instance, the probability of trusting the local administration in non-capital cities is on the whole higher than trusting the local administration in a capital city. Th e impact on trust of living in a capital or noncapital city in CEE-countries is much larger than in Western countries (odds ratios for distrust are 0.34 and 0.42 in Western countries for non-capital and capital cities respectively, and 0.35 and 0.63 respectively for residents in non-capital and capital cities in CEE countries).
A major example of interaction eff ects is also that the combination of dissatisfaction with high-expectation issues combined with living in a CEE country has an additional eff ect on increased distrust (Odds ratio = 2.31). In Western countries, it is especially the dissatisfaction with low-expectation issues that has such an additional eff ect (Odds ratio = 2.26).
A third example is the interaction eff ect found in the combination of being dissatisfi ed with high-and low-expectation issues and living in a Western capital. It makes the probability of distrusting the local administration increase significantly, compared to having the same dissatisfaction while living in a CEE country (Odds ratio = 3.38). Th e interaction eff ect between the two types of satisfaction on trust is also noticeable in CEE countries, but it is smaller in those countries (Odds ratio = 2.50).
Poverty in combination with dissatisfaction with low expectations also has a small, additional eff ect on increased distrust, but it is minor compared to the interaction eff ects discussed above (Odds ratio = 1.17).
Th is is illustrated in Table 4 , where we give the eff ects of both kinds of satisfaction and poverty on trust in the local administration in four contexts, based on living in a capital city or not and living in a CEE country or not. Th e fi rst two columns in the table give the four distinct contexts, based on the respondent being resident in a capital city or not, and living in a Western or CEE country. Th e third column gives the number of respondents within each context, followed by the percentage of them trusting the local administration in general. Th is column shows that trust in local administrations is especially low for residents of capital cities in Central and Eastern European countries. Th e next three columns give the eff ects of the independent variables on trust. Given are the odds ratios (exp (β)), indicating the increase or decrease in the probability of trusting the local administration when the independent variable changes to the value as given. Th us, when respondents are satisfi ed with low-expectation issues, they are 2.58 times as likely to trust the local administration compared to those who are dissatisfi ed with low-expectation issues. When the odds ratio are below 1 -as is the case for the eff ect of poverty -the probability of trust decreases when the independent variable has the assigned value (sometimes / oft en having trouble paying the bills) compared to respondents having the opposite value (never problems to pay the bills). Th e last two columns give statistics about the model as a whole, that is, the variance explained, and the percentage of people that are correctly classifi ed as trusting or distrusting the local administration based on their scores on the independent variables. Th e eff ect of satisfaction with low-expectation issues on trust seems to be the most robust. It hardly varies over the distinguished contexts, although it is somewhat lower in capital cities in CEE countries. Th is is diff erent for the eff ect of sat-isfaction with high-expectation issues as well as for the eff ect of poverty on trust. Th e eff ect of poverty on trust in the local administration is signifi cant and in the expected direction in Western countries, irrespective of living in a capital city or not. If a person is (sometimes) unable to pay the bills and lives in a Western country, it does impact on his / her trust in the local public administration. Th is eff ect is not visible in CEE countries, as its eff ect is insignifi cant in these countries. Th is might be explained by the more extended coverage of social benefi ts in Western countries as compared to those in CEE countries, making it understandable that individuals in Western countries are more inclined to blame the insuffi cient social benefi ts received from the local administration if one gets into payment defi cits. As for the eff ect of satisfaction with high-expectation issues, although the eff ect is in the same direction in all four distinguished contexts, its eff ect within capital cities is smaller than in non-capital cities. Th is is the case in CEE countries as well as Western countries. Th ese are illustrations of some of the interaction eff ects found through loglinear modeling.
Conclusions
Th is article compared the level of generalized institutional trust in local administration in capital and non-capital cities in Europe. Such institutional trust was conceived in similar terms as interpersonal trust, namely in terms of encapsulated interests and fulfi lling expectations. Th is article fi rst analyzed why there can be more doubt about the inclination of a capital city's local administration to act on behalf of its residents, than in non-capital cities. Especially the symbolic and economic functions of capital cities for the nation as a whole and issues related to the proximity of capital cities to national government were found to result in doubts whether decisions by the local administration are made mainly with the interests of its residents in mind, which is the fi rst condition for trust. Secondly, it was argued that high as well as low expectations might be more extreme in capital cities than in non-capital cities and that the extent to which these expectations are met further impacts on the trust in the local administration.
Th is resulted in the hypothesis that generalized institutional trust in the local administration of capital cities is signifi cantly lower than such trust in non-capital cities.
In our re-analysis of Urban Audit data (European Commission 2010), we compared the opinions of residents of capitals with those of residents in secondary cities in the same country. Th at secondary analysis shows that signifi cant diff erences do emerge. Residents of capital cities do indeed have signifi cantly less trust in their local administration than residents of secondary cities. It was also shown that satisfaction with the extent to which high and low expectations are met does signifi cantly infl uence the trust in the local administration. If such satisfaction is completely absent, about 20 % of the residents have trust in their local administra-tion, whereas more than 80 % of the residents that are completely satisfi ed with the extent to which their expectations are met show institutional trust. Th ese relations remain signifi cant in a multivariate analysis, controlling for other relevant factors. Loglinear modeling showed the signifi cance of several interaction eff ects, especially showing that the impact of satisfaction with expectations on the generalized institutional trust is stronger in non-capital cities than in capital cities, and stronger in CEE countries than in Western European countries.
Th e main conclusion is twofold. First, generalized institutional trust is comparable to interpersonal trust, as generalized trust also depends on the knowledge, or doubts, that it is in the interest of the trusted actor to encapsulate the interests of the trustee, and that such trust also depends on the presumed capacity of the trusted one to fulfi l the expectations of the trustee. Second, living in a capital or non-capital city does make a signifi cant diff erence in terms of expectations about public issues and being confi dent that the local administration is able to take care thereof. It does not make a diff erence whether we talk about the satisfaction with high-or low-expectation issues, e.g. whether it is about amenities or nuisances. Th e degree to which both kinds of expectations are satisfi ed has an equally strong eff ect on the trust in the local administration.
Of course, this study has its limitations as readers might judge the reasoning to be indirect, that citizens in capital cities have more doubts about the encapsulation of their interests in the decisions of their local administration than citizens in non-capital cities. We acknowledge this, although it is hard to fi nd an alternative explanation for the diff erences in trust in the local administrations of capital and non-capital cities.
If the outcomes are accepted as valid, they have consequences for understanding trust in other levels of government as well. If institutionalized trust can indeed be conceived in terms of encapsulated interests and fulfi lling expectations about public issues in the area for which such a public institution is primarily responsible, this has implications for the explanation of the decreasing trends in such generalized institutional trust at the national level, as well. If citizens start to doubt that national government acts on their behalf, and if they judge that their expectations about public issues are not met by the public institution they hold responsible, they will start to distrust that public institution. Th is could be the consequence of widespread corruption in government, making people doubt whether government offi cials act on their behalf. It could also be a consequence of -in itself benevolent -policies such as welcoming asylum seekers, aiding other countries, or signing international treaties, where national inhabitants do not see the benefi ts or are continuously told by the media that these are not to their benefi t. Th is is especially the case if citizens lose trust that their government is able to solve the public issues that concern them, that is, when government does not live up to their expectations. In this regard, the globalization of governance, the hollowing out of government, the failures in policies, and the ailing of public leadership might be causes for the low trust in government.
